Terrorist attacks and political and social attitudes in Europe.

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0. Abstract

This paper estimates the causal effect of the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in France on public opinion using a difference-in-differences design across eleven rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2022), comparing France against thirteen other European countries. We find no significant change in immigration attitudes following the attacks. However, French respondents placed significantly less importance on strong government ($p < 0.05$) and tradition ($p < 0.001$), and shifted rightward ideologically (+0.256, $p < 0.001$). A parallel analysis of Norway's 2011 attacks shows a shift toward more permissive immigration attitudes, consistent with perpetrator beliefs shaping public responses to terrorism.

1. Introduction

In November 2015 and July 2016, France experienced the two deadliest terrorist attacks since 1961. The Paris attacks of November 13th to 14th , 2015, which killed 130 people at the Bataclan and bars around the Stade de France, followed by the Nice attacks of July 14th , 2016, which killed 86 people during a Bastille day celebrations. These attacks are a sudden shock to the French public's sense of physical security, national identity, and social cohesion. Whether these shocks translate into detectable and lasting changes in public opinion on immigration (as both attacks were committed by French citizens and residents of foreign origin), political ideology, trust, and values is an important question for understanding the political consequences of terrorism.

This paper asks: did the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks causally change public opinion in France? Using data from eleven rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2022), I used the timing and geographic concentration of the attacks to implement a DiD design that compares

France against a control group of other ESS participating countries, before and after ESS Round 8 (2016) the first survey wave conducted after the attacks. The outcomes of interest are immigration attitudes (willingness to admit immigrants from poorer non-European countries, perceived cultural effect of immigration, and economic effects of immigration), political ideology (left to right self placement), trust (most people can be trusted), and human values including preferences for rule following, strong government, and tradition. The identification strategy I will be using relies on the fact that the 2015 and 2016 attacks were concentrated in France and were much larger than other attacks in ESS countries during the same period. This gives us a clear treated country and a plausible control group. I used the 11 round, over two decade long, ESS panel data to test whether France and the control countries were on parallel trends before the attacks. We also ran an event study that traces how any difference between France and the control group evolved round by round, using Round 7 (2014) as the baseline. As robustness tests, we excluded the UK from the control group since the Brexit referendum in June 2016 was a major political shock that independently shifted immigration attitudes there, making it potentially a poor counterfactual for France, and we also ran a placebo test using gender as the outcome, which should not respond to a terrorism shock.

Figure 1. Parallel Trends: Immigration from Poorer Countries



The results vary quite a bit across outcomes. For immigration attitudes specifically, we found no statistically significant DiD effect: the coefficient on the primary immigration attitude variable (impcntr) is -0.078 ($p = 0.28$), and no significant post-treatment shift is detected for the perceived cultural or economic effects of immigration (imueclt, imbgeco) or trust (ppltrst). However, three outcomes show statistically significant post-treatment changes in France relative to the control group. French respondents shifted rightward on the left to right ideology scale by 0.256 points ($p < 0.001$), however, parallel trends plot, France trends steeply upward from rounds 5 to 7 the two lines are already converging before Round 8.



This means the DiD result for ideology may partly reflect a pre-existing trend rather than a response to the attacks or even a shift in politics before an election. Survey responders placed less importance on strong government and safety by 0.097 points ($p = 0.015$), and placed less importance on tradition by 0.180 points ($p < 0.001$). Preferences for rule-following (ipfrule) show no significant change. To test whether the identity of the perpetrator shapes the public response to terrorism, I also ran a parallel DiD for Norway using the July 2011 Utøya and Oslo attacks as the treatment event. Because those attacks were carried out by a native-born far-right extremist (neo-Nazi) targeting the political left rather than a foreign-origin Islamist, a simple fear-driven anti-immigration response is not predicted and indeed Norway shows a shift toward more permissive immigration attitudes after 2012.

The individual level controls show patterns consistent with the broader literature. Older respondents and native born individuals hold more restrictive immigration views; men are somewhat more restrictive than women; higher national unemployment rates are associated with

greater opposition to immigration, while higher GDP per capita is associated with more accepting attitudes. Ultimately, the results suggest that the 2015-2016 attacks did not change French attitudes toward immigration directly, but did produce a reorientation in values and political identity.

2. Literature Review

The closest study to this paper is Mirza, Stancanelli and Verdier (2022), who use high frequency in home scanner data for around 15,000 French households to estimate the immediate consumption effects of the November 2015 Bataclan attack. Combining a regression discontinuity design with a DiD approach, they find short lived increases in expenditure on sweets and home maintenance products, consistent with stress created behavioral responses. These effects fade quickly and are concentrated among households with children and those located within 400 kilometres of Paris, suggesting that the impact of the attacks was geographically bounded and demographically heterogeneous. While their study mainly focuses on consumption rather than attitudes, it provides complementary evidence that the Bataclan attack produced measurable behavioral responses among the French population especially close to Paris. The literature on the political and economic consequences of terrorism in Europe is surveyed by Krieger and Meierrieks (2019), who argue that the indirect costs of terrorism including behavioral responses by individuals and governments, typically exceed the direct costs of destruction. One of the key findings is that people systematically overestimate the probability of more attacks after terrorist attacks, creating an excess demand for security and fueling rightward shift in policy preferences. This prediction is consistent with the significant rightward movement in left to right self placement detected in this paper, though it also raises the question

of why views on immigration remained unaffected despite the political shift. The macroeconomic controls used in the present analysis draw on the immigration and labor market context documented for France by d'Albis, Boubtane and Coulibaly (2016).

3. Data & Methods:

3.1 Data Sources

The individual level data come from the European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial survey conducted across European countries that asks representative samples of respondents about their attitudes, values, and socio-demographic characteristics. This paper uses all eleven rounds of the ESS, covering survey years from 2002 to 2022. The study sample is restricted to respondents in countries that participated alongside France, giving a final dataset of around 322,000 individual observations. The thirteen control countries are Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia, selected because they participated in every ESS round alongside France. France is the treated country and all other countries in the sample form the control group. France accounts for about 6.3 percent of the total sample, and 35.5 percent of observations fall in the post-treatment period (ESS rounds 8 through 11, covering 2016 to 2022). Eight outcome variables are drawn from the ESS. Three measure immigration attitudes: willingness to allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe (impcntr, scale 1 to 4, where 1 = allow many and 4 = allow none), whether immigration undermines or enriches cultural life (imueclt, 0 to 10), and whether immigration is good or bad for the economy (imbgeco, 0 to 10). Three are values, all measured on a reverse coded 1 to 6 scale where 1 means "very much like me" and 6 means "not like me at

all": the importance of following rules (ipfrule), the importance of strong government and safety (ipstrgv), and the importance of tradition and customs (imptrad). The remaining two outcomes are interpersonal trust (ppltrst, 0 to 10) and left to right self-placement (lrscale, 0 to 10, where 0 is left and 10 is right). Because the three variables are reverse coded, a positive DiD coefficient means respondents moved away from identifying with that value, not toward it. Country level control variables are merged from four World Bank sources (GDP per capita in current US dollars, total population, the unemployment rate as a percentage of total labor force, and net migration measured in absolute number of persons) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GDP per capita and population are averaged over the ESS survey year and the prior year. The unemployment rate and net migration as a share of population follow the same approach as this would allow us to make it more accurate for smaller countries. Terror fatality counts from the GTD are summed over the same two-year window because unless we would completely lose the Bataclan attacks. All macro controls are matched to the ESS at the country-by-round level, so they vary across countries and rounds but are the same for all individuals within the same country and round.

3.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 0 presents summary statistics for the full sample. The average respondent is 49 years old, roughly half female (53 percent), and about 30 percent college educated. On immigration attitudes, the average impcntr score is 2.46, which falls between "allow some" and "allow a few," indicating moderate restriction preferences on average. Here are some maps showing the change over time of European beliefs:

Immigration Effect on Economy — 2002



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Immigration Effect on Economy — 2022



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Allow Immigrants from Poorer Non-EU Countries — 2002



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Allow Immigrants from Poorer Non-EU Countries — 2022



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Immigration Effect on Cultural Life — 2002



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Immigration Effect on Cultural Life — 2022



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Left-Right Self-Placement — 2002



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Left-Right Self-Placement — 2022



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Interpersonal Trust — 2002



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

Interpersonal Trust — 2022



Source: European Social Survey. Grey = not in study sample.

The mean left to right score is 5.06, slightly right of center. The average unemployment rate across country-rounds is 7.5 percent, and net migration averages 0.73 percent of population.



The terror deaths variable has a mean of 6 and a maximum of 256, reflecting the fact that most country rounds have few or no terror fatalities, but a small number, including France in the 2015-2016 period have very high counts.

Table 0.1 Descriptive Statistics

ESS Survey Year	Age: France	Age: Control	Female %: France	Female %: Control	College %: France	College %: Control	Foreign-born %: France	Foreign-born %: Control	N: France	N: Control
2002	47.2	46.1	54.5	51.6	25.7	22.8	9.8	7.0	1454	26576

2004	48.9	46.6	53.1	53.7	25.0	23.2	7.5	8.0	1765	27957
2006	48.0	47.6	53.1	53.6	26.4	25.4	9.9	8.8	1956	27521
2008	48.5	47.9	54.2	52.8	30.4	27.2	8.0	9.6	2019	28042
2010	49.4	48.0	53.5	52.9	26.6	26.9	8.9	9.8	1700	27707
2012	51.8	48.6	55.3	52.8	27.6	28.0	10.6	10.3	1944	29495
2014	49.8	49.4	52.5	52.3	33.0	31.0	11.6	10.7	1887	27227
2016	52.3	49.4	53.9	51.6	29.3	33.3	10.1	11.0	2034	26695
2018	52.3	49.9	54.2	51.7	34.6	35.3	11.9	12.1	1947	24790
2020	49.5	50.6	50.6	52.2	36.8	38.1	11.5	10.9	1902	30728
2022	50.1	51.0	50.1	52.3	40.3	37.8	10.1	11.9	1708	23577

Table 0.1 shows how the composition of the France and control group samples changed across ESS rounds. The two groups look basically the same throughout the sample period with some minor differences. Average age, the share of female respondents, and the share of foreign born respondents are similar across France and the control group in most rounds. College education rates are also close, though both groups show a rising trend over time as younger, more educated cohorts enter the sample. There are no sharp discontinuities in these characteristics around Round 8, which is reassuring it suggests the treatment variable is not simply picking up changes in who is being surveyed in France relative to other countries. One pattern worth noting is that France's college share dips from 33.0% in Round 7 to 29.3% in Round 8, while the control group's college share rises slightly over the same period. If anything, this works against finding more restrictive immigration attitudes in France post-treatment, since

college-educated respondents tend to hold more liberal views on immigration. This means the null result on immigration attitudes is unlikely to be explained by compositional changes in education. In any case, college education is included as a control variable in all regressions, so any remaining compositional differences are absorbed.

3.3 Identification Strategy

The goal of this paper is to estimate whether the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in France caused a change in public opinion. The challenge is that we cannot simply compare French attitudes before and after the attacks, because many other things changed in France over that period that could also affect attitudes, for example, the European migration crisis, economic conditions, or changes in the political power. To get around this, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) design. The basic idea is to compare how France changed after the attacks relative to how other European countries changed at the same time. If the other countries serve as a good counterfactual, this means they would have followed a similar trend to France in the absence of the attacks, then any extra change in France after Round 8 can be attributed to the attacks. The main regression specification is:

$$Y_{ict} = \sigma_c + \sigma_t + \sum_{k=-7}^{3} \beta_k \left(France_c \times I[t = k]\right) + X_{ict}\lambda + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where Y is the outcome for individual i in country c at ESS round t. σ_c and σ_t are country and ESS round fixed effects respectively. $France_c$ equals 1 for France and 0 for all other countries. I[t = k] is an indicator that equals 1 in ESS round k, where k runs from -7 to +3 relative to the treatment round (Round 8 = 2016). The coefficients β_k trace out how French attitudes evolved relative to the control group in each round, with Round 7 (2014) omitted as the baseline. A β_k close to zero for k < 0 supports the parallel trends assumption, while β_k for k ≥ 0 captures the post-treatment effect. X_{ict} is a vector of individual controls including age, gender, whether the respondent was born in the country, college education, subjective health, happiness, whether the respondent belongs to a discriminated group, and domicile (urban-rural), as well as country level macro controls for GDP per capita, unemployment, population, net migration, and terror deaths. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. We run three versions of each regression: a baseline with no controls, a version with individual demographic controls only, and a full specification that adds the macro controls. The preferred specification is the full controls version. For the main DiD estimate, the event study coefficients for rounds 8 through 11 can be averaged or the interaction France × Post can be used as a single treatment indicator. Each outcome is estimated separately, giving eight sets of estimates in total.

3.4 Identifying assumptions and threats to validity

The key assumption for the DiD design to be valid is parallel trends: in the absence of the 2015-2016 attacks, France and the control countries would have followed the same trend in public opinion. This cannot be directly tested, but it can be checked in the pre-treatment period. I

do this using an event study, which replaces the single Post dummy with a set of dummies for each ESS round relative to Round 8, omitting Round 7 (2014) as the baseline. If the pre-treatment coefficients are close to zero and not statistically significant, that supports the parallel trends assumption. There are two main threats to validity worth flagging. First, the parallel trends plots show that for left to right ideology (lrscale), France was already trending upward relative to the control group from rounds 5 to 7, before the attacks. This pre-existing variation in left to right ideology means the DiD estimate for lrscale should be interpreted with a grain of salt, as it may just be showing a pre-existing trend rather than a clean response to the attacks. The parallel trends look much cleaner for the immigration attitude outcomes and for the values variables. Second, the sample has only 14 country clusters, which is on the low end for cluster-robust inference. This means the standard errors may not fully account for within-country correlation, and statistical significance thresholds should be interpreted with some caution. We ran two robustness checks. The first excludes the United Kingdom from the control group, because the Brexit referendum in June 2016 was a major political shock that could make the UK a potentially poor counterfactual for France. The second is a placebo test that uses gender as the outcome variable. Since gender is fixed at birth (in the biological sense, not the social sense) and cannot respond to a terrorism shock, a significant DiD estimate for gender would suggest the results are driven by changes in sample composition rather than actual shifts for outcomes. We expect a non significant result. Additionally, there are several additional limitations worth being transparent about as if we didn't it would compromise this study. The 2015-2016 attacks were heavily politicized in France, with the Rassemblement National (at the time it was called the Front National) and other right-wing parties using them to push anti-immigration rhetoric in the media and in political debate. This means that any measured changes in attitudes may reflect political

messaging and media framing instead of a psychological response to the attacks themselves. The DiD design cannot separate these two, it can only tell us that something changed in France relative to other countries after Round 8, not why it changed. France has only around 1,700 to 2,000 respondents per ESS round, which is relatively small for detecting modest ideological changes. This limits statistical power and may partly explain some of the non significant results we have got; we cannot always distinguish between a true zero effect and an effect that is simply too small to detect with this sample size. Most importantly, the ESS was not designed for this kind of causal analysis. It is a repeated cross-section, not a panel, so we cannot track the same individuals over time before and after the attacks. In a perfect world, we would use individual level panel data that follows exact same French respondents across multiple years. The results in this paper should therefore be understood as establishing a research strategy and providing suggestive evidence, rather than definitive causal estimates. With a better dataset, for example, a panel survey of French and European respondents focusing specifically around the attack dates, the identification would be considerably more accurate. The timing of ESS Round 8 creates an aggregation problem. Fieldwork in France was conducted throughout 2016, meaning Round 8 captures the combined aftermath of both the November 2015 Bataclan attack and the July 2016 Nice attack, as well as just the November 2015 Bataclan attack. Since survey taking ran across the full year, some respondents will have been surveyed before the Nice attack in July 2016 and others after it, meaning that within Round 8 itself there is variation in how many attacks respondents had actually experienced at the time of their interview. We cannot isolate the effect of any single event, and the measured responses most likely show a mix of reactions at different points in time instead of a response to a single clean shock. Several other European countries in the control group also experienced significant terrorist attacks during the post-treatment window,

Germany in December 2016, and the UK in 2017. If these attacks shifted attitudes in control countries as well, then the control group is a contaminated counterfactual and the DiD will underestimate the true effect in France. The robustness check excluding the UK partially manages this, but Germany remains in the control group. There is still a potential survey response bias as there is with almost all surveys. People who were most affected by or anxious about the attacks may have been more or less likely to participate in the ESS in Round 8. If response rates changed drastically in France after the attacks, the Round 8 sample may not be representative in the same way as earlier rounds, and the estimates could partly reflect who chose to respond rather than actual ideological change.

4. Results

The main results are shown in Tables 1 through 8, which show the DiD estimates across all three specifications for each outcome. The preferred estimates come from column (3) of each table, which includes the full set of individual demographic controls and country level controls with ESS round fixed effects.

4.1 Immigration Attitudes

The main immigration outcome, Table 1 shows that the DiD coefficient on impcntr is -0.078 in the full controls specification.

Table 1. DiD Estimates: Allow Immigrants from Poorer Countries

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.115	-0.126*	-0.078
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.067)
Observations	278,374	278,374	278,374
R-squared	0.118	0.181	0.182

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

This is not statistically significant. The event study plot in Figure 9 confirms this picture: the pre-treatment coefficients are close to zero and mostly within the confidence interval band, and the post-treatment coefficients remain near zero as well.

Figure 9. Event Study: Immigration from Poorer Countries



There is no evidence of a detectable shift in people wanting to allow immigration from poorer non-European countries following the attacks. The other two immigration outcomes tell a similar story. Table 2 shows that the DiD coefficient on imueclt (whether immigration enriches or undermines cultural life) is +0.164 and not statistically significant.

Table 2. DiD Estimates: Cultural Effects of Immigration

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(1) No controls	(2) Demo controls	(3) Full controls

France × Post	0.163	0.213	0.164
	(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.187)
Observations	271,803	271,803	271,803
R-squared	0.067	0.146	0.148

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3 shows the coefficient on imbgeco (whether immigration is good or bad for the economy) is -0.197, also not significant.

Table 3. DiD Estimates: Economic Effects of Immigration

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.212	-0.158	-0.197
	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.146)
Observations	271,522	271,522	271,522
R-squared	0.069	0.149	0.152

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$





The event study plots for both variables show noisy pre-treatment periods with wide confidence intervals, particularly for imbgeco, where France and the control group appear to diverge somewhat in the early rounds before converging again around Round 7. This pre-treatment noise means the parallel trends assumption is somewhat less clean for these two outcomes, and the non significant results should be interpreted with that caveat in mind. Nevertheless, the point estimates are not large and none reach statistical significance. Ultimately, the three immigration attitude outcomes provide no evidence that the 2015-2016 attacks caused French public opinion toward immigration to become measurably more restrictive. This is a shocking finding given the fact that both attacks were perpetrated by individuals of foreign origin with Islamic ties, and were extensively used by the French right to argue for tighter immigration controls and attack the left 'Islamo-leftism'. That this rhetoric did not translate into a detectable survey level change in immigration attitudes, at least as measured by the ESS, is itself interesting, though the limited statistical power from France's sample size of around 2,000 per

round means we cannot rule out small effects as a larger sample size would give us a clearer look at the true beliefs.

4.2 Values

The results are different for the human values outcomes. Table 5 shows that the DiD coefficient on ipstrgv (importance of strong government and safety) is +0.097, statistically significant at the five percent level.

Table 5. DiD Estimates: Importance of Strong Government

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	0.072*	0.065	0.097**
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	233,342	233,342	233,342
R-squared	0.056	0.076	0.077

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6 shows that the DiD coefficient on imptrad (importance of tradition and customs) is +0.180 significant at the one percent level.

Table 6. DiD Estimates: Importance of Tradition and Customs

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	0.114***	0.108***	0.180***
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	235,108	235,108	235,108
R-squared	0.041	0.106	0.106

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Both of these variables are reverse coded on a 1 to 6 scale where higher values mean the respondent does not identify with the trait, so positive coefficients indicate that French respondents moved away from these values relative to the control group after the attacks. In

other words, French respondents placed less importance on strong government and safety, and less importance on tradition, compared to what would have been expected based on pre-treatment trends and the control group. These effects are modest but not nothing. The ipstrgv coefficient of 0.097 corresponds to about 8% of one standard deviation on that scale (SD = 1.187). The imptrad coefficient of 0.180 represents about 13 percent of one standard deviation (SD = 1.369). These are not large effects in absolute terms, but they are consistent across specifications, the imptrad estimate in particular is significant even in the baseline specification with no controls (Table 6, column 1: 0.114, $p < 0.01$), and grows slightly when macro controls are added, which suggests it is not driven by differences in respondants between the treatment and control groups. The event study plots for both outcomes support the validity of these results.



The event study for ipstrgv shows pre-treatment coefficients that are broadly scattered around zero, there is some noise in earlier rounds but no clear pre-existing trend. The post-treatment period shows a positive shift that is sustained across rounds 0 through +2.



The event study for imptrad also shows a reasonably good pre-treatment period, with the post-treatment coefficients turning positive. These patterns are consistent with a post-treatment shift instead of a possible pre event trend. In contrast, Table 4 shows that the DiD coefficient on ipfrule (importance of following rules) is +0.062, not statistically significant.

Table 4. DiD Estimates: Importance of Following Rules

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.049	-0.052	0.062
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.057)
Observations	234,270	234,270	234,270
R-squared	0.057	0.087	0.088

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



The event study for ipfrule shows a considerable pre-treatment dip in rounds -3 and -2, which complicates the interpretation even if the post-treatment coefficients are near zero. The null result for ipfrule is consistent with the pattern in the other values variables being driven by something specific to security and tradition rather than a general shift in conformity values.

4.3 Trust and Political Ideology

Table 7 shows that the DiD coefficient on trust (ppltrst) is +0.053, not statistically significant. The parallel trends plot shows that France has consistently lower trust than the

control group average throughout the sample period, but the two lines track each other reasonably well before Round 8 and the post-treatment gap does not appear to widen.

Table 7. DiD Estimates: Interpersonal Trust

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.020	0.021	0.053
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Observations	277,890	277,890	277,890
R-squared	0.134	0.192	0.192

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$





The event study for ppltrst shows coefficients close to zero before and after the treatment. There is no evidence that the attacks reduced or increased trust in France relative to other European countries. The control variables for trust show the patterns we did not necessarily expect: college education has a particularly large positive association with trust (+0.668, $p < 0.001$), consistent with the literature linking education to social capital, while unhappiness and rural residence are both associated with lower trust. The left to right ideology result is the most statistically significant finding in the paper, but also the most difficult to interpret. Table 8 shows a DiD coefficient of +0.256 on lrscale, indicating that French respondents shifted approximately 0.26 points rightward on the 0-10 scale relative to the control group after Round 8.

Table 8. DiD Estimates: Left-Right Self-Placement

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(1) No controls	(2) Demo controls	(3) Full controls

France × Post	0.222***	0.210***	0.256***
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Observations	251,526	251,526	251,526
R-squared	0.031	0.051	0.051

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

This is significant at the one percent level and stable across all three specifications. However, as flagged in Section 3.4 and visible in Figure 8, the parallel trends plot shows that France was already trending rightward relative to the control group from rounds 5 to 7, before the attacks occurred.



The event study in Figure 10 makes this even clearer: the pre-treatment coefficients are all negative and in some cases statistically significant, which means France was already scoring lower on lrscale than would be predicted by the parallel trends assumption. The post-treatment shift toward zero in the event study actually represents France catching up to a predicted level

rather than a clean discontinuous jump caused by the attacks. The lrscale DiD estimate of +0.256 cannot be interpreted as a causal effect of the attacks with confidence. It is likely that some or all of this estimate reflects the possible pre-existing rightward trend in French political identity that was already happening before the Bataclan attack, most likely because France had a leftist government which was not very popular near the middle to end of their term. We kept the result in the paper for completeness, but it should be taken with a grain of salt at best.

5. Robustness Checks:

This section presents two robustness tests to see whether the results are affected by specific features of the sample or research design. The first excludes the United Kingdom from the control group. The second uses gender as a placebo outcome.

5.1 Excluding the United Kingdom

The first robustness check drops the United Kingdom from the control group and re-estimates the main DiD specification for all eight outcomes. The motivation is that the Brexit referendum took place in June 2016, squarely within the ESS Round 8 fieldwork period. Brexit was a major political shock that independently shifted public opinion in the UK on immigration, national identity, and left to right ideology. If the UK is included in the control group, its post-Brexit shifts may contaminate the counterfactual and affect the estimated DiD coefficients for France. The results from this check are presented in Table RC1, and the event study comparison for the primary immigration outcome (impcntr) is shown in Figure RC1.

Figure RC1. Event Study: Immigration from Poorer Countries



The figure overlays the event study coefficients from the full sample with those from the UK-excluded sample (red circles) for impcntr. The two sets of estimates are very similar throughout the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. The confidence intervals overlap substantially at every round, and the point estimates move in the same direction. This suggests that the UK is not driving the main results (which is a very good sign). When it comes to statistically significant outcomes, excluding the UK leaves the key findings intact. The DiD estimates for ipstrgv and imptrad remain positive and statistically significant, and the statistically non significant results for the immigration attitude variables are unchanged. The lrscale estimate also remains large and significant, though as discussed in Section 4, this result should still be interpreted cautiously due to the pre-existing trend. Overall, the UK exclusion check gives us confidence that the control group composition is not the source of the main findings.

5.2 Gender Placebo

The second robustness check uses gender as a placebo outcome. The logic is pretty much common sense: gender is determined at birth and cannot respond to a terrorism shock or any other political or social event. If the DiD design is picking up genuine attitudinal changes rather than spurious variation, for example, changes in who chooses to respond to the ESS survey in France relative to other countries after Round 8, then the DiD estimate using gender as the outcome should basically be zero or at least near zero. A significant result would be a red flag suggesting that sample composition is changing differentially in France, which would undermine all of the results. Table RC2 shows the DiD estimates for gender across the three specifications. The France x Post coefficient is small and only statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the naive specification. The full controls estimate is -0.006 (SE = 0.008) which is close to zero and not significant at the 5 percent level.



The event study for the gender placebo is shown in Figure RC2. The coefficients bounce around zero throughout the entire pre and post treatment period, with no systematic pattern and all estimates well within the confidence interval band. This is a reassuring finding. It means that the composition of the French ESS sample relative to the control group did not change in a way that would bias the main results. The France x Post indicator is not simply capturing a shift in who is being surveyed, but rather appears to reflect actual changes in the attitudes of the people being surveyed. Combined with the balance table evidence in Section 3.2 showing no clear discontinuities in sample characteristics around Round 8, the gender placebo supports the internal validity of the main estimates.

6. The Norway Case: A Contrasting Natural Experiment

6.1 Motivation

The France DiD analysis asks whether terrorism changes public opinion. But not all terrorism is the same, far from that. The 2015–2016 Paris and Nice attacks were carried out by individuals of foreign origin with Islamist ties, and were rapidly politicized by the French right as evidence of the failures of immigration and multiculturalism, however no party in France is pushing for the Jihadist beliefs pushed by the perpetrators. If the observed attitude changes in France are driven not just by the experience of terrorism per se, but by the specific framing of attacks as a product of immigration and Jihadist Islam, then we would expect very different effects from an attack that cannot be given that framing. The Utøya and Oslo attacks of July 22nd, 2011, provide exactly this contrast. Anders Breivik was a Norwegian-born citizen with no immigrant background who explicitly targeted the Norwegian Labour Party youth wing because of its pro-multicultural, pro-immigration policies, and Islamo-leniency. The attacks were motivated by far-

right, neo-Nazi, white supremacist, anti-Muslim ideology, making them ideologically the opposite of the Paris attacks, these attacks was a incident white-Jihad in contrast to Islamic Jihad. If terrorism by foreign-origin perpetrators increases anti-immigration sentiment, then terrorism by a native-born far-right perpetrator targeting pro-immigration politics, reflecting beliefs of some fringe political parties in Norway, should either produce no change in immigration attitudes or, through a backlash effect, produce more tolerant views regarding immigration. Norway therefore, offers another European natural experiment that tests whether the identity and political beliefs of the perpetrator is what really impacts the attitudinal response to terrorism. I implemented the same DiD design for Norway as for France, with Norway as the treated country and the same control countries (now including France) as the donor pool. The treatment date is ESS Round 6 (2012), the first ESS survey conducted after the July 2011 attacks. The reference category for the event study is Round 5 (2010).

6.2 Norway DiD Results: Immigration Attitudes

The parallel trends plot for immigration from poorer countries is really interesting. Norway runs consistently below the control group throughout the pre-treatment period (Norway around 2.31, control group around 2.47), meaning Norway was already more permissive on immigration before the attacks. After Round 6 (2012), Norway drops sharply while the control group also falls but much more slowly: by 2022 Norway has reached approximately 1.85 while the control group sits around 2.25. The gap between the control and Norway grows in the post-treatment period.

Norway Table 1. DiD Estimates: Allow Immigrants from Poorer Countries

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.169***	-0.151***	-0.172***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.055)
Observations	278,374	278,374	278,374
R-squared	0.118	0.181	0.183

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



The Norway event study for immigration from poorer countries confirms the trend seen in the parallel trend. The pre-treatment coefficients for rounds 1 through 4 are small and mostly floating around 0, being slightly above zero in 2002–2004 (~+0.07 to +0.09), which is basically at zero in 2008-2010. After Round 6, the coefficients turn negative and grow larger in magnitude: approximately -0.12 in 2012, -0.18 in 2014, -0.15 in 2016, -0.20 in 2018, and -0.30 in 2022. This is the clearest treatment effect visible in the Norway analysis.





For economic effects of immigration, the parallel trends show Norway running consistently above the control group throughout the sample, Norway scores approximately 5.4-

6.0 on the 0-10 scale vs the control group at 4.9-5.9. Both groups trend upward over time, with Norway keeping its higher level. The gap does not obviously widen post-treatment. The event study for economic effects of immigration is noisy with pre-treatment hovering near zero and a small jump in 2012. The direction turns negative from 2016 onward (-0.33) but is statistically insignificant.

Norway Table 3. DiD Estimates: Economic Effects of Immigration

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.068	-0.096	-0.161
	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.161)
Observations	271,522	271,522	271,522
R-squared	0.068	0.149	0.152

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



6.3 Norway DiD Results: Trust, Ideology, and Values

For interpersonal trust, the parallel trends plot shows that Norway stays at a consistently higher level of trust than the control group average (something that was expected considering Scandinavian culture) throughout the entire sample period, being roughly 1.5 points higher on the 0–10 scale. The two lines run basically parallel before and after Round 6, with no visible post-treatment divergence apart from 2020 (something which could potentially be explained because of a different COVID policy than control countries). The event study for trust shows pre-treatment coefficients that are positive but then decline in 2008 and 2010, then post-treatment coefficients that remain near zero with no clear trend. The DiD estimate for trust is not statistically significant. Norway's structurally high trust is stable and unaffected by the attacks in either direction, most likely due to the underlying culture of the country.

Norway Table 7. DiD Estimates: Interpersonal Trust

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(1) No controls	(2) Demo controls	(3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.088	-0.077	-0.046
	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.060)
Observations	277,890	277,890	277,890
R-squared	0.134	0.192	0.192

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$





For left-to-right ideology, the parallel trends plot reveals the spike already described in Section 6.1. The event study shows the round-by-round breakdown. The pre-treatment period shows a clear violation of parallel trends: 2004 is at -0.32, and 2006 is at -0.22, indicating that Norway was already trending leftward relative to the control group before the attacks. At Round

6 (2012) there is a sharp positive spike to +0.12, the brief rightward movement was then followed by a return to negative from 2016 onward (reaching -0.18 to -0.27 in 2016 and 2018, respectively).

Norway Table 8. DiD Estimates: Left-Right Self-Placement

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.051	-0.018	0.027
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.059)
Observations	251,526	251,526	251,526
R-squared	0.031	0.050	0.051

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$





For the values outcomes available for Norway, the event studies show a consistent pattern of pre-existing differences rather than treatment effects. For rule-following and strong government, Norway had substantially higher pre-treatment coefficients throughout (around +0.16 to +0.37 for rules, +0.11 to +0.38 for strong government), meaning Norway placed considerably more importance on these values relative to the control group even before the attacks. The post-treatment coefficients remain at similar positive levels, showing no treatment effect, Norway simply kept its pre-existing high identification with these values compared to the control countries.


Parallel Trends: Importance of Following Rules
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
4.4
4.2
4
3.8
3.6
0
2
4
6
8
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Event Study: Norway — Importance of Following Rules
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.6
.4
.2
0
-.2
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Parallel Trends: Importance of Strong Government and Safety
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
4
0
2
4
6
8
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Event Study: Norway — Importance of Strong Government and Safety
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.6
.4
.2
0
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year

For tradition, the picture being presented is quite different: pre-treatment coefficients shows to be slightly negative (Norway slightly less tradition-oriented), and post-treatment the picture is mixed, with some positive coefficients at 2016 (+0.11). The parallel trends plot for tradition shows Norway and the control group running in a very close to perfect parallel at different levels, with both falling post-treatment but Norway staying relatively higher at least 2016 and onward.





6.4 France vs Norway: What the Comparison Tells Us

The France and Norway DiD results together provide a natural test of the perpetrator-framing hypothesis. The main finding is that neither country shows a significant increase in anti-immigration attitudes following the attacks. In France, the attacks by foreign-origin perpetrators did not produce more anti-immigration views. In Norway, the attacks by a native-born far-right perpetrator appear to have created more permissive views on immigration as a countershock to the anti-immigration attack. The two findings are consistent with each other if we believe that public opinion is more responsive to the fact that the attacks in Paris and Nice did not really represent a political party (no party in France is pushing for Jihad), but the rhetoric of the perpetrator in the Norway attacks was the same as that of many extreme right parties in Norway. This would therefore mean that the Norway attacks could be more easily linked to an actual party, rather than just a very fringe ideology that does not represent a party or immigration as a whole. The Norway analysis of course should be interpreted with the same caveats that apply to France: the ESS is a repeated cross-section, the sample size per round is around 1,800–2,000 respondents (a little larger than France), the treatment is an ESS round rather than an exact date, and several control group countries experienced huge political shifts during the period, such as the UK with Brexit.

7. Conclusion:

This paper asked whether the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in France caused measurable changes in public opinion, using a difference-in-differences design that compares France against thirteen other ESS countries across eleven survey rounds from 2002 to 2022. The results vary

quite a bit but they tell a clear story. Across the three immigration attitude outcomes: willingness to allow immigrants, perceived cultural effects, and perceived economic effects, we find no statistically significant post-treatment change in France relative to the control group. Trust is also unaffected. The attacks do not appear to have pushed French public opinion toward measurably more restrictive immigration views, at least as captured by the ESS. Where we do find significant effects is in two human values outcomes. French respondents placed less importance on strong government and safety (ipstrgv, +0.097, $p = 0.015$) and less importance on tradition and customs (imptrad, +0.180, $p < 0.001$) relative to the control group after Round 8. Both results are stable across specifications and supported by clean pre-treatment parallel trends in the event studies. We also find a large and statistically significant rightward shift in left to right self-placement (+0.256, $p < 0.001$), but a pre-existing upward trend in France from rounds 5 to 7 means this result cannot be attributed to the attacks with confidence. There are several important limitations to keep in mind. The ESS is a repeated cross-section, not a panel, so we cannot track the same individuals over time. The French sample of around 1,700 to 2,000 respondents per round is relatively small, which limits our ability to detect modest effects. ESS Round 8 fieldwork ran throughout 2016, meaning some respondents were surveyed before the Nice attack and others after it, creating within-round variation in treatment exposure that we cannot account for. Several control group countries like Germany, and the UK, also experienced large terrorist attacks in the post-treatment period, which may have biased the estimate DiD effects negatively. It is also necessary to point out that Belgium had a large attack in 2016, despite the fact that it is not in the control group its proximity to many of the control group countries is still worth pointing out. And the DiD design cannot separate the direct psychological effect of the attacks from the political messaging and media framing that followed them, particularly from the French

right and far-right. There are several natural extensions that future research papers could look at. The best improvement would be to use individual level panel data that follows the exact same respondents before and after the attacks, which would allow for a better estimate of ideological change. A regression discontinuity design exploiting the exact date of the Bataclan or Nice attacks, comparing respondents surveyed just before and just after each event, would also make the identification considerably better, similar to the approach used by Mirza, Stancanelli and Verdier (2022) for consumption. It would also be worthwhile looking at the French sample by region, given that the Bataclan study found effects concentrated within 400 kilometres of Paris, and by religion or immigrant background such as continent of origin, to test whether the attitudinal response differed across subgroups. Finally, continuing the analysis to other major European attack sequences, such as the 2004 Madrid bombings or the 2011 Norway attacks, would allow for a more robust comparative test of whether the French findings generalise across different political and countries. The results of this paper were surprising to us. Going into this analysis, the expectation was that the 2015 and 2016 attacks, the two deadliest in French history, both carried out by individuals of foreign origin, would have pushed French public opinion toward more restrictive immigration attitudes. They did not, at least not in any statistically significant way. Whether this reflects an actual absence of effect or simply the limits of the ESS sample size in France (1,700 to 2,000 respondents per round) is something we cannot fully resolve with the data available. The Norway case reinforces this interpretation. Following the Utøya and Oslo attacks of July 2011, carried out by a neo-Nazi, Norway showed a significant shift toward more permissive immigration attitudes (-0.172, $p < 0.01$), this is what is expected as people would have an inverse impact of the beliefs of the perpetrator. Neither country shifted toward anti-immigration sentiment following a major attack, but the direction of the values and

immigration effects differs in ways that are consistent with perpetrator framing mattering more than the attacks themselves. One of the contrasts is with tradition: France shows a significant shift away from traditional values (+0.180, $p < 0.001$) while Norway does not (+0.053, not significant). Now Norway and France both show a statistically significant positive shift on importance of strong government even though this completely contradicts my previous beliefs (assuming that no matter the ideology of the terrorist people would want a stronger government to be able to fight the terrorism).


Event Study: Immigration: Economic Effects
Coefficient relative to ESS round 7 (2014)
1
.5
0
-.5
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Importance of Tradition and Customs
Coefficient relative to ESS round 7 (2014)
.3
.2
.1
0
-.1
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2002
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2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Immigration: Cultural Effects
Coefficient relative to ESS round 7 (2014)
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0
-.5
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Importance of Following Rules
Coefficient relative to ESS round 7 (2014)
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.2
0
-.2
-.4
2002
2004
2006
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2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year



Figure 1. Parallel Trends: Immigration from Poorer Countries



Figure 2. Parallel Trends: Cultural Effects of Immigration



Figure 3. Parallel Trends: Economic Effects of Immigration



Figure 4. Parallel Trends: Importance of Following Rules



Figure 5. Parallel Trends: Importance of Strong Government



Figure 6. Parallel Trends: Importance of Tradition and Customs



Figure 7. Parallel Trends: Interpersonal Trust



Figure 8. Parallel Trends: Left-Right Self-Placement



Figure 9. Event Study: Immigration from Poorer Countries



Figure 10. Event Study: Left-Right Self-Placement



Event Study: Interpersonal Trust



Figure RC1. Event Study: Immigration from Poorer Countries



Figure RC2. Placebo Test: Gender







Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.





Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.





Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.


France: Cultural Effects of Immigration
istribution of responses, pre-treatment (2002-2008) vs post-treatment (2016-2022)
Frequency
1500
1000
500
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 = Undermines, 10 = Enriches
Pre-treatment (rounds 1-
Post-treatment (rounds 8


France: Cultural Effects of Immigration by Survey Year
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Density
Response
Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.





Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.


France: Importance of Strong Government and Safety
istribution of responses, pre-treatment (2002-2008) vs post-treatment (2016-2022)
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Frequency
Very like me
Not like me
Importance of Strong Government (reverse-coded)
Pre-treatment (rounds 1-
Post-treatment (rounds 8


France: Importance of Strong Government by Survey Year
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Density
Response
Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.





Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.





Each panel shows the response distribution for French respondents in that survey year.
Vertical scale is density. Variables cleaned of don't know / refusal codes.


Event Study: Norway — Immigration: Economic Effects
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.5
0
-.5
-1
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Immigration from Poorer Countries
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.2
0
-.2
-.4
2002
2004
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2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Importance of Tradition and Customs
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.2
.1
0
-.1
-.2
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Immigration: Cultural Effects
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
1
.5
0
-.5
2002
2004
2006
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2012
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2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Importance of Following Rules
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.6
.4
.2
0
-.2
2002
2004
2006
2008
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2012
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2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Importance of Strong Government and Safety
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.6
.4
.2
0
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Left-Right Self-Placement
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Event Study: Norway — Interpersonal Trust
Treatment: Utøya/Oslo attacks, July 2011
Coefficient relative to ESS round 5 (2010)
.6
.4
.2
0
-.2
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
ESS Survey Year


Parallel Trends: Immigration: Economic Effects
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
6.5
6
5.5
5
4.5
0
5
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


'arallel Trends: Immigration from Poorer Countries (Allow Many/Few)
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
2.6
2.4
2.2
2
1.8
0
5
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Parallel Trends: Importance of Tradition and Customs
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
4.3
4.2
4.1
4
3.9
3.8
0
2
4
6
8
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Parallel Trends: Immigration: Cultural Effects
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
6.8
6.6
6.4
6.2
6
5.8
0
5
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Parallel Trends: Importance of Following Rules
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
4.4
4.2
4
3.8
3.6
0
2
4
6
8
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Parallel Trends: Importance of Strong Government and Safety
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
4
0
2
4
6
8
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Parallel Trends: Left-Right Self-Placement
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
5.6
5.4
5.2
5
4.8
0
5
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey


Parallel Trends: Interpersonal Trust
Norway vs average of control countries
Mean response
7
6.5
6
5.5
5
0
5
10
ESS Round
Norway
Control countries
Vertical line = ESS round 6 (2012), first post-Utøya survey

Table 0. Summary Statistics

	(1)	
	Mean	Std. Dev.
Allow immigrants from poorer non-European countries (1=many, 4=none)	2.434	0.888
Immigration effect on cultural life (0=undermines, 10=enriches)	5.899	2.473
Immigration effect on economy (0=bad, 10=good)	5.255	2.424
Important to follow rules and do as told (1=very like me, 6=not like me)	3.769	1.396
Important: strong government and safety (1=very like me, 6=not like me)	4.590	1.197
Important to follow traditions and customs (1=very like me, 6=not like me)	4.177	1.375
Interpersonal trust (0=cannot trust, 10=most can be trusted)	5.211	2.404
Left-right self-placement (0=left, 10=right)	5.044	2.176
Age	48.802	18.672
Gender (1=male, 2=female)	1.524	0.499
Born in country (1=yes, 2=no)	1.095	0.293
College educated (1=yes, 0=no)	0.296	0.456
Subjective general health (1=very good, 5=very bad)	2.196	0.900
Happiness (0=extremely unhappy, 10=extremely happy)	7.460	1.855
Member of discriminated group (1=yes, 2=no)	1.928	0.259
Domicile (1=big city, 5=rural area)	2.996	1.194
Terror deaths: sum(survey year + prior year)	6.414	27.331
Log GDP per capita: mean(survey year + prior year)	10.484	0.587
Unemployment rate: mean(survey year + prior year)	7.480	4.041
Log population: mean(survey year + prior year)	16.641	1.156
Net migration % of pop: sum(2yr migr) / mean(2yr pop)	0.748	0.790
=1 if France	0.071	0.257
=1 if ESS round >= 8	0.354	0.478
France x Post	0.027	0.161
Observations	285686	

Unit of observation: individual respondent. Macro controls vary at country x ESS round level. Outcome variables cleaned of ESS 'don't know' / 'refusal' codes prior to summarising.

Table 0.1 Descriptive Statistics

ESS Survey Year	Age: France	Age: Control	Female %: France	Female %: Control	College %: France	College %: Control	Foreign-born %: France	Foreign-born %: Control	N: France	N: Control
2002	47.2	46.1	54.5	51.6	25.7	22.8	9.8	7.0	1454	26576
2004	48.9	46.6	53.1	53.7	25.0	23.2	7.5	8.0	1765	27957
2006	48.0	47.6	53.1	53.6	26.4	25.4	9.9	8.8	1956	27521
2008	48.5	47.9	54.2	52.8	30.4	27.2	8.0	9.6	2019	28042
2010	49.4	48.0	53.5	52.9	26.6	26.9	8.9	9.8	1700	27707
2012	51.8	48.6	55.3	52.8	27.6	28.0	10.6	10.3	1944	29495
2014	49.8	49.4	52.5	52.3	33.0	31.0	11.6	10.7	1887	27227
2016	52.3	49.4	53.9	51.6	29.3	33.3	10.1	11.0	2034	26695
2018	52.3	49.9	54.2	51.7	34.6	35.3	11.9	12.1	1947	24790
2020	49.5	50.6	50.6	52.2	36.8	38.1	11.5	10.9	1902	30728
2022	50.1	51.0	50.1	52.3	40.3	37.8	10.1	11.9	1708	23577

Table 1. DiD Estimates: Allow Immigrants from Poorer Countries

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.115	-0.126*	-0.078
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.067)
Observations	278,374	278,374	278,374
R-squared	0.118	0.181	0.182

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2. DiD Estimates: Cultural Effects of Immigration

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	0.163	0.213	0.164
	(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.187)
Observations	271,803	271,803	271,803
R-squared	0.067	0.146	0.148

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3. DiD Estimates: Economic Effects of Immigration

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.212	-0.158	-0.197
	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.146)
Observations	271,522	271,522	271,522
R-squared	0.069	0.149	0.152

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4. DiD Estimates: Importance of Following Rules

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.049	-0.052	0.062
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.057)
Observations	234,270	234,270	234,270
R-squared	0.057	0.087	0.088

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5. DiD Estimates: Importance of Strong Government

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	0.072*	0.065	0.097**
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	233,342	233,342	233,342
R-squared	0.056	0.076	0.077

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6. DiD Estimates: Importance of Tradition and Customs

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	0.114***	0.108***	0.180***
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	235,108	235,108	235,108
R-squared	0.041	0.106	0.106

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7. DiD Estimates: Interpersonal Trust

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	-0.020	0.021	0.053
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Observations	277,890	277,890	277,890
R-squared	0.134	0.192	0.192

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8. DiD Estimates: Left-Right Self-Placement

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
France × Post	0.222***	0.210***	0.256***
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Observations	251,526	251,526	251,526
R-squared	0.031	0.051	0.051

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9 Spec3

	1 Allow many/few immigrants from poorer non-European countries	2 Immigration undermines or enriches cultural life	3 Immigration good or bad for the economy	4 Important to do what is told and follow rules	5 Important that government is strong and ensures safety	6 Important to follow traditions and customs	7 Most people can be trusted	8 Left-right self-placement
France x Post	-0.078	0.164	-0.197	0.062	0.097**	0.180***	0.053	0.256***
	-0.067	-0.187	-0.146	-0.057	-0.038	-0.037	-0.045	-0.022
Age	0.007***	-0.007***	-0.001	0.011***	0.006***	0.016***	0.004***	0.009***
	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
gndr=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
gndr=2	-0.031*	0.08	-0.274***	-0.062**	0.059***	0.163***	-0.099***	-0.192***
	-0.017	-0.061	-0.033	-0.026	-0.015	-0.035	-0.027	-0.043
Born outside country (%)=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Born outside country (%)=2	-0.126***	0.627***	0.748***	0.218***	0.180***	0.263***	-0.144**	-0.07
	-0.038	-0.12	-0.123	-0.038	-0.039	-0.055	-0.05	-0.063
No college	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
College	-0.271***	0.985***	0.954***	-0.198***	-0.225***	-0.172***	0.664***	-0.141*
	-0.015	-0.059	-0.038	-0.02	-0.031	-0.029	-0.039	-0.074
Subjective general health=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Subjective general health=2	0.008	-0.091***	-0.086***	-0.037***	-0.026	-0.002	-0.156***	-0.085***
	-0.006	-0.012	-0.021	-0.01	-0.015	-0.008	-0.018	-0.021
Subjective general health=3	0.026**	-0.208***	-0.253***	-0.032	0.02	0.006	-0.418***	-0.195***
	-0.01	-0.035	-0.037	-0.023	-0.027	-0.014	-0.024	-0.041

Subjective general health=4	0.065***	-0.361***	-0.400***	0.009	0.091***	0.059**	-0.640***	-0.228***
	-0.012	-0.039	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.022	-0.039	-0.055
Subjective general health=5	0.080***	-0.455***	-0.514***	0.091	0.167***	0.147***	-0.794***	-0.197**
	-0.021	-0.076	-0.065	-0.052	-0.04	-0.045	-0.044	-0.076
Happiness	-0.037***	0.154***	0.160***	0.027***	0.022***	0.053***	0.187***	0.071***
	-0.005	-0.015	-0.012	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.009	-0.009
Member of discriminated group=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Member of discriminated group=2	0.084***	-0.168***	-0.137***	0.083**	-0.04	-0.028	0.375***	0.296***
	-0.017	-0.049	-0.043	-0.028	-0.027	-0.035	-0.037	-0.058

Domicile=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Domicile=2	0.045**	-0.155**	-0.154***	0.01	0.005	0.032	-0.106***	0.209***
	-0.017	-0.053	-0.045	-0.021	-0.018	-0.028	-0.029	-0.045
Domicile=3	0.072***	-0.259***	-0.282***	0.042	0.038	0.076**	-0.131***	0.161***
	-0.019	-0.072	-0.051	-0.024	-0.024	-0.029	-0.032	-0.043
Domicile=4	0.123***	-0.470***	-0.428***	0.095***	0.027	0.160***	-0.149***	0.344***
	-0.016	-0.073	-0.045	-0.028	-0.021	-0.029	-0.037	-0.068
Domicile=5	0.135***	-0.534***	-0.494***	0.054	-0.039	0.208***	-0.082*	0.398***
	-0.016	-0.07	-0.047	-0.033	-0.029	-0.039	-0.041	-0.087
Terror deaths: sum(survey year + prior year)	0	0	0.001	-0.001**	0	-0.001***	0	0
	0	-0.001	-0.001	0	0	0	0	0

Log GDP per capita: mean(survey year + prior year)	0.424*	-0.755	-0.82	0.242	-0.062	-0.013	-0.023	0.481**
	-0.231	-0.632	-0.642	-0.253	-0.123	-0.131	-0.193	-0.221
Unemployment rate: mean(survey year + prior year)	0	0.004	-0.045*	0.006	0.003	0.005	0.011	0.004
	-0.009	-0.026	-0.024	-0.011	-0.006	-0.006	-0.011	-0.012
Log population: mean(survey year + prior year)	0.072	3.284	0.68	0.149	1.350**	0.252	-0.731	-0.83
	-0.917	-2.194	-2.026	-1.028	-0.472	-0.578	-0.676	-0.699

Net migration % of pop: sum(2yr migr) / mean(2yr pop)	-0.035	0.073	0.111*	0.023	0.053***	0.058***	0.085*	-0.007
	-0.03	-0.075	-0.061	-0.03	-0.016	-0.014	-0.04	-0.027
Constant	-3.301	-41.549	1.98	-2.086	-17.645**	-1.266	15.782	12.567
	-14.414	-35.216	-31.968	-17.382	-7.613	-9.955	-10.221	-11.424
Observations	278,374	271,803	271,522	234,270	233,342	235,108	277,890	251,526
R-squared	0.1825	0.1479	0.1519	0.0878	0.0774	0.1062	0.1919	0.051
R-squared (within)	0.0731	0.0864	0.0896	0.0328	0.0224	0.0683	0.0665	0.0208
N clusters	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14

Robust standard errors clustered at country level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10 Norway spec 3

	1 Allow many/few immigrants from poorer non-European countries	2 Immigration undermines or enriches cultural life	3 Immigration good or bad for the economy	4 Left-right self-placement	5 Most people can be trusted	6 Important to follow traditions and customs	7 Important to do what is told and follow rules	8 Important that government is strong and ensures safety
Norway x Post	-0.172***	-0.038	-0.161	0.027	-0.046	0.053	0.086	0.105***
	-0.055	-0.172	-0.161	-0.059	-0.06	-0.05	-0.08	-0.034
agea	0.007***	-0.007***	-0.001	0.009***	0.004***	0.016***	0.011***	0.006***
	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
gndr=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
gndr=2	-0.031*	0.08	-0.273***	-0.193***	-0.099***	0.163***	-0.062**	0.059***
	-0.017	-0.061	-0.033	-0.043	-0.027	-0.035	-0.026	-0.015
brncntr=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

brncntr=2	-0.126***	0.627***	0.748***	-0.07	-0.144**	0.263***	0.218***	0.181***
	-0.038	-0.12	-0.124	-0.063	-0.05	-0.055	-0.038	-0.039
No college	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
College	-0.271***	0.985***	0.955***	-0.141*	0.664***	-0.172***	-0.198***	-0.225***
	-0.015	-0.059	-0.038	-0.074	-0.039	-0.029	-0.02	-0.031
Subjective general health=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Subjective general health=2	0.007	-0.091***	-0.086***	-0.085***	-0.156***	-0.002	-0.037***	-0.026
	-0.006	-0.012	-0.021	-0.021	-0.018	-0.008	-0.01	-0.015
Subjective general health=3	0.025**	-0.208***	-0.254***	-0.194***	-0.418***	0.007	-0.032	0.02
	-0.01	-0.035	-0.037	-0.041	-0.024	-0.014	-0.023	-0.027
Subjective general health=4	0.064***	-0.360***	-0.401***	-0.226***	-0.640***	0.060**	0.01	0.092***
	-0.012	-0.039	-0.04	-0.055	-0.039	-0.022	-0.03	-0.03

Subjective general health=5	0.080***	-0.454***	-0.515***	-0.195**	-0.794***	0.148***	0.091	0.168***
	-0.022	-0.076	-0.065	-0.076	-0.044	-0.045	-0.052	-0.04
Happiness	-0.037***	0.155***	0.160***	0.071***	0.187***	0.053***	0.027***	0.022***
	-0.005	-0.015	-0.012	-0.009	-0.009	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005
Member of discriminated group=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Member of discriminated group=2	0.084***	-0.168***	-0.137***	0.296***	0.375***	-0.028	0.083**	-0.041
	-0.017	-0.049	-0.043	-0.058	-0.037	-0.035	-0.028	-0.027
Domicile=1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Domicile=2	0.045**	-0.154**	-0.155***	0.211***	-0.105***	0.033	0.01	0.006
	-0.017	-0.053	-0.045	-0.044	-0.029	-0.028	-0.021	-0.018

Domicile=3	0.072***	-0.258***	-0.283***	0.163***	-0.131***	0.077**	0.042	0.038
	-0.019	-0.071	-0.051	-0.043	-0.032	-0.028	-0.024	-0.024
Domicile=4	0.122***	-0.469***	-0.429***	0.346***	-0.149***	0.161***	0.096***	0.027
	-0.016	-0.072	-0.045	-0.067	-0.037	-0.028	-0.028	-0.021
Domicile=5	0.135***	-0.532***	-0.496***	0.400***	-0.082*	0.209***	0.054	-0.039
	-0.015	-0.07	-0.047	-0.087	-0.041	-0.038	-0.033	-0.028
Terror deaths: sum(survey year + prior year)	0	0	0	0.001**	0	0	-0.001**	0
	0	0	-0.001	0	0	0	0	0
Log GDP per capita: mean(survey year + prior year)	0.432	-0.8	-0.781	0.419*	-0.04	-0.049	0.236	-0.074
	-0.248	-0.604	-0.609	-0.235	-0.191	-0.128	-0.244	-0.115

Unemployment rate: mean(survey year + prior year)	-0.001	0.003	-0.046*	0.003	0.01	0.005	0.007	0.003
	-0.009	-0.026	-0.024	-0.012	-0.011	-0.007	-0.011	-0.006
Log population: mean(survey year + prior year)	0.313	3.345	0.906	-0.871	-0.664	0.159	0.003	1.173**
	-0.957	-2.398	-2.191	-0.778	-0.743	-0.66	-1.118	-0.497
Net migration % of pop: sum(2yr migr) / mean(2yr pop)	-0.032	0.071	0.116*	-0.012	0.085*	0.053***	0.021	0.050**
	-0.03	-0.076	-0.059	-0.028	-0.039	-0.015	-0.031	-0.017
Constant	-7.383	-42.088	-2.182	13.895	14.838	0.64	0.395	-14.580*
	-15.054	-38.307	-34.512	-12.601	-11.22	-11.31	-18.878	-8.065
Observations	278,374	271,803	271,522	251,526	277,890	235,108	234,270	233,342

R-squared	0.1829	0.1478	0.1519	0.0508	0.1919	0.106	0.0878	0.0774
R-squared (within)	0.0736	0.0863	0.0896	0.0206	0.0665	0.0682	0.0328	0.0224
N clusters	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14

Standard errors clustered at country level.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table RC1. Robustness Check 1: Exclude UK from Control Group

	1 impcntr	2 imueclt	3 imbgeco	4 ipfrule	5 ipstrgv	6 imptrad	7 ppltrst	8 lrscale
France x Post	-0.104	0.294	-0.085	0.067	0.105**	0.161***	0.042	0.260***
	-0.076	-0.173	-0.131	-0.058	-0.045	-0.039	-0.051	-0.03
Observations	257056	250889	250529	214942	214136	215757	256603	232527
R-squared	0.186	0.145	0.15	0.092	0.081	0.109	0.201	0.052

United Kingdom excluded from control group. France remains the treated unit with treatment cutoff at ESS round 8. Full individual and macro controls included. Country and ESS round fixed effects absorbed. Standard errors clustered at country level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table RC2. Robustness Check 2: Placebo Outcome Test Gender

	(1) No controls	(2) Individual controls	(3) Full controls
France x Post	-0.009*	-0.008	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	285238.000	278374.000	278374.000
R-squared	0.003	0.007	0.007

Dependent variable is gender (gndr). Gender is excluded from the control set since it is the outcome. Under the null hypothesis that terrorism does not affect a pre-determined characteristic, the DiD coefficient should be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Country and ESS round fixed effects absorbed. Standard errors clustered at country level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 1. DiD Estimates: Allow Immigrants from Poorer Countries

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.169***	-0.151***	-0.172***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.055)
Observations	278,374	278,374	278,374
R-squared	0.118	0.181	0.183

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 2. DiD Estimates: Cultural Effects of Immigration

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	0.231**	0.187	-0.038
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.172)
Observations	271,803	271,803	271,803
R-squared	0.067	0.146	0.148

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 3. DiD Estimates: Economic Effects of Immigration

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.068	-0.096	-0.161
	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.161)
Observations	271,522	271,522	271,522
R-squared	0.068	0.149	0.152

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 4. DiD Estimates: Importance of Following Rules

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	0.052	0.080	0.086
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.080)
Observations	234,270	234,270	234,270
R-squared	0.057	0.087	0.088

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 5. DiD Estimates: Importance of Strong Government

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	0.172***	0.188***	0.105***
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Observations	233,342	233,342	233,342
R-squared	0.057	0.077	0.077

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 6. DiD Estimates: Importance of Tradition and Customs

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	0.027	0.070**	0.053
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.050)
Observations	235,108	235,108	235,108
R-squared	0.041	0.106	0.106

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 7. DiD Estimates: Interpersonal Trust

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.088	-0.077	-0.046
	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.060)
Observations	277,890	277,890	277,890
R-squared	0.134	0.192	0.192

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Norway Table 8. DiD Estimates: Left-Right Self-Placement

	(1) (1) No controls	(2) (2) Demo controls	(3) (3) Full controls
Norway × Post	-0.051	-0.018	0.027
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.059)
Observations	251,526	251,526	251,526
R-squared	0.031	0.050	0.051

Robust standard errors clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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